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Introduction 
 
It seems intuitive that boundaries, and the processes through which they are constructed, 
reinforced, transcended, or dissolved are an important aspect of organisation, as well as of social 
life more generally.  People are constantly parcelling up their worlds, and having their worlds 
parcelled up for them, by a series of distinctions between inside and outside, identity and 
difference.  However, there are many pitfalls on the road to theorising organisational boundaries.  
This paper attempts to identify some of the more serious of these as a prelude to thinking about 
the ambiguous boundaries of project organisations.  These, perhaps more than other 
organisational forms, make it difficult to ignore the multiple and cross-cutting character of 
constructions of identity and difference.  The multi-functional and often multi-organisational 
nature of projects, bringing together diverse individuals and groups, lend them a hybrid character 
of being simultaneously inside and outside, of difference within identity.  Alternative 
conceptions of boundaries within organisation theory will be explored to consider how far they 
are able to address the hybridity of project organisations.  These vary from unitarist treatments of 
organisations which tend to depict their boundaries as precise limits of containment, to 
approaches which see boundaries in more open terms as zones of interaction, to social 
constructionist accounts which emphasise the constitution of boundaries through ongoing 
processes of inclusion and exclusion, and finally to approaches which have questioned the 
appropriateness of the boundary metaphor altogether. 
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A central feature of these alternative ways of characterising boundaries is the different 
implications they hold for the theorisation of identity and difference.  Attributions of Self and 
Other are inescapably bound up with the marking of boundaries, which is about identifying and 
imposing distinctions.  The key question concerns whether these distinctions are self-contained, 
implying a singular and internally coherent identity, or whether there is always some slippage 
between categorisations of Self and Other.  In thinking about the hybridity of project 
organisations, the notion of a lucid and homogeneous identity would appear to be problematic.  
However, we are then left with the challenge of how to think of the coexistence or 
interpenetration of identity and difference.  This theme is explored, first more generally through 
an account of the plurality and partially overlapping character of boundary-constituting processes 
in and around projects, and then more specifically in relation to the problems of communication 
and inter-subjective understanding between the diverse groups of individuals involved in 
projects.  This latter focus of attention is predicated on the belief that, since there is a crucial 
discursive aspect to the constitution of identity and difference, an examination of the nature of 
communicative practices should yield some interesting insights into the conditions through 
which such boundary-defining processes are played out.   
 
Alternative conceptions of boundaries in organisation theory 
 
Although the language of boundaries regularly makes an appearance in organisation theory, 
efforts to conceptualise them have remained, by and large, less than explicit.  The intention here 
is to foreground the notion of ‘boundary’ on the belief that a more nuanced treatment of this 
concept helps us to address a number of key issues about the meaning of organisation and 
organising.  While boundaries have tended to be peripheral to the dominant themes of 
organisation theory (no pun intended), it is nevertheless possible to detect, if sometimes only by 
inference, a number of alternative ways in which they appear within discourses on organisation.  
Moreover, investigating the manner in which metaphors of boundary are employed by different 
bodies of theory is informative for revealing some of the key assumptions these approaches make 
about the nature of organising and the character of social action.  It is not my intention to provide 
an exhaustive review of the labyrinthine twists and turns of organisation theory, but it is 
worthwhile to take some time to consider a few of the broader contours of how different 
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accounts vary in their treatment of boundaries.  For these purposes it is useful to distinguish 
between four styles of approach which lie at different points on a continuum stretching from 
portrayals of boundaries as object-like and absolute entities, at one extreme, to 
conceptualisations which appear to deny any significant relevance to boundaries, at the other.  
The four styles are considered under the following headings: boundaries as a metaphor of 
containment; boundaries as permeable membranes; boundaries as socio-culturally constructed; 
and network metaphors and the dissolution of boundaries.  
 
Boundaries as a metaphor of containment 
 
Here the treatment of boundaries follows the largely common-sense notion of a boundary as a 
clear line of demarcation between an inside and an outside.  Inside and outside are depicted as 
radically distinct with minimal interactions between the two.  Grabher (1993), borrowing a rather 
clumsy term from Georgescu-Roegen (1971), describes such non-overlapping states as 
arithmomorphic, where there is no scope for recognising that concepts often contain elements of 
their opposites.  In organisational terms this corresponds to approaches which portray 
organisations unproblematically as object-like, coherent, and clearly circumscribed units of 
economic or other activity.  Such treatments can be found in classical organisation theory, where 
organisations are anthropomorphised into independent actors seemingly possessing their own 
intentionality, a point which has become a major bone of contention in recent debates about 
whether organisations can be said to learn (e.g. Argyris and Schön, 1978; Easterby-Smith, 1997; 
Hayes and Allison, 1998; Kim, 1993; Mueller and Dyerson, 1999).  The problem with an 
anthropomorphised treatment is that it promotes an excessively stable, one might say naturalised, 
image of organisations where internal differences and competing beliefs and actions are glossed 
over.  The boundaries of organisation are those of a passive container, a legal, bureaucratic, or 
administrative shell, within which the key problem of co-ordination has been effectively resolved 
because it is assumed that the goals and activities of an organisation and its members are one and 
the same.   
 
Another important feature of accounts which see organisational boundaries in these terms is that 
they follow a binary logic.  The socio-economic landscape is clearly subdivided between the 
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organisation and everything that lies beyond its borders.  This dichotomous image is clearly 
evident in theories of the firm based on the economics of transaction costs (hereafter TCE), at 
least in their earlier variants, where economic activity is neatly dissected into markets and 
hierarchies (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975).  As Richardson (1972, 883) expressed it, the 
picture here is one of “islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations”.  Almost 
inescapably, such discourses create the impression of organisations as sites of order and stability 
in the midst of a chaotic external environment.  For Granovetter (1985), this is symptomatic of 
underlying assumptions about the character of social life, similar to Rawls’s ‘original position’ or 
Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’, in which it is assumed that people, collectively, have an innate 
tendency towards disorder so the question becomes one of explaining how order emerges out of 
chaos (compared with the opposing and equally incomplete view that humans are fundamentally 
co-operative and order-desiring animals). 
  
It is not my intention to get drawn too far into the detailed debate between TCE and its critics 
(for contributions to this debate see, for example: Berger et al., 1993; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; 
Grabher, 1993; Granovetter, 1985, 1992; Håkansson and Johanson, 1993; Johanson and 
Mattsson, 1991; McGuinness, 1990; Ouchi, 1980; Powell, 1987; 1990; Tsang, 2000).  However, 
since TCE seems to provide, for many at least, a not implausible explanation of why 
organisational boundaries exist, it deserves more than a passing mention.  Taking its inspiration 
from the work of Coase (1937), TCE is primarily concerned with the question why it is that some 
economic transactions occur within markets while others happen within firms.  The emergence 
of organisations, according to TCE, is largely a response to market failure; it is more efficient 
(i.e. it costs less) to conduct certain types of transaction (those which are repetitive, uncertain, 
and involve high asset specificity) within a firm rather than through open market exchange.  
Despite more recent modifications to the transaction costs approach through its recognition of 
“transactions in the middle range” (Williamson, 1985, 83), it has remained basically wedded to 
this internalisation versus externalisation or make or buy problem, simply adding to the number 
of alternative governance forms available (see also, Ouchi, 1980; Williamson, 1991).   
 
As Grabher (1993) has suggested, the addition of intermediate or hybrid arrangements falling 
between the extremes of market and hierarchy does little to undermine the disjunctive logic of 
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treating varied forms of governance and co-ordination as discretely identifiable (one might 
equally say, clearly bounded) alternatives.  Even with the modified scheme, different governance 
forms are depicted as a menu of well-defined options from which economic decision-makers 
make a boundedly rational choice by calculating the arrangement most likely to minimise 
transaction costs given the specific conditions of uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity 
associated with the transaction.  A major criticism with this approach is that it is poorly placed to 
supply a genuinely dynamic conceptualisation of organisational forms.  For McGuinness (1990) 
the dynamic component of TCE is primarily limited to what might be called a comparative 
statics approach in which temporality is reduced to a progression of static ‘solutions’ based on 
efficiency considerations.  This tends towards a hypostasised image of organisational forms, 
almost existing as predetermined blueprints independent of the processes, relations, and actions 
through which they are constituted.  Furthermore, as Nooteboom (2000, 920) argues, 
“transaction cost theory commits the functionalist fallacy ... that since organizations exist, they 
must yield optimal efficiency, because if they were not optimal, they would not have survived”.  
Imai (1989, 124) has captured something of the importance of moving from a static depiction of 
organisational arrangements as discrete, off-the-peg, efficiency-maximising alternatives, towards 
a more dynamic, socio-economically embedded, process-based understanding: 
 
... the crucial strategic consideration for the modern-day firm is not choosing the ‘best’ hierarchical 
organizational form within the fixed boundary of the firm or choosing the ‘best’ mixture of internal 
production/outside purchase.  Instead, the crucial consideration must be to build a social and economic 
context conducive to spontaneous and varied interactions of people inside and outside the firm.  The 
boundary separating the interior and exterior ... is not constant but is formed and continuously updated as a 
result of interactions. 
 
The distinction here is roughly that between organisation as a structural unit, a straightforward 
container in which activity is played out, and organising as an ongoing accomplishment of social 
interactions, sense-making processes, and linked activities (cf. Coopey et al., 1997; Czarniawska, 
1996; Weick, 1979, 1995).  Granovetter (1985, 1992), in developing his embeddedness 
approach, has offered convincing arguments against what, borrowing a term from Wrong (1961), 
he sees as an oversocialised conception of human action in the hierarchies side of the markets 
and hierarchies formula.  Accordingly, once a hierarchical arrangement has been selected as the 
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most appropriate governance form, individuals are portrayed as mechanistically acting out 
patterns of behaviour driven by internalised customs, habits, or norms determined by their role 
position.  However, as Granovetter (1985, 486, emphasis original) suggests, “culture is not a 
once-for-all influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during 
interaction”.  In more recent work, Williamson (1996, chapter 9) appears to accept this argument, 
but then goes on to suggest that insights generated by the embeddedness approach can largely be 
reduced to questions of economising behaviour, thus seeming to miss Granovetter’s point that 
economic and non-economic motivations are always coexistent and tend to be interwoven in 
complex ways.   
 
One corollary of the economic-rational, mechanistic model of organisational behaviour 
associated with TCE is that it promotes a unitarist view of organisation.  It is unitarist in the twin 
sense that it implies one best organisational arrangement for any given set of transactional 
conditions (the flip-side of the functionalist fallacy mentioned above), as well as portraying 
organisations as internally coherent, homogeneous entities whose co-ordination is assured 
because individuals blindly follow pre-determined behavioural patterns.  Moreover, a unitarist 
view of organisation is simultaneously an image of organisation as self-sufficiently contained 
within discrete boundaries.  Wheatley (1992, 28) sees a close relationship between mechanistic 
approaches and the drawing of boundaries: 
 
 A world based on machine images is a world filled with boundaries.  In a machine, every piece knows its 
place.  Likewise, in Newtonian organizations we’ve drawn boundaries everywhere ... These omnipresent 
boundaries create a strong sense of solidity, of structure that secures things, a kind of safety. 
 
As we shall see in the next three sub-sections, the reassuring solidity of organisational 
boundaries encouraged by the container view is, to varying extents, shown to be illusory. 
 
Boundaries as permeable membranes 
 
Approaches which characterise organisational boundaries in this second way share several points 
of contact with the container view, particularly in tending to make dualistic distinctions between 
organisation and environment.  However, the absoluteness of the distinction, and the lack of 
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conditioning interactions between the two, are partly dissolved through attempts, of varying 
ingenuity, to theorise how the inside and outside of organisations interrelate.  In some cases, such 
as contingency theory, the conditioning influences seem to be practically unidirectional (e.g. 
Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, 1967b; Lorsch and Morse, 1974; 
Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965), whereas in others, such as some of the more sophisticated 
accounts of autopoietic systems, organisation and environment are in a co-conditioning, or even 
co-defining relationship (e.g. Luhmann, 1995; Maturana, 1999; Maturana and Varela, 1980, 
1987).   
 
For all its weaknesses, one of the contributions of contingency theory was the way it began to 
challenge the consensualist and unitarist assumptions of classical organisation theory.  Firstly, 
the whole problematic of integration in the face of internal differentiation was recognised as an 
important issue in organisation and it was no longer assumed that the internal coherence of 
organisations was guaranteed (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, 1967b).  Secondly, the notion that 
there is a single blueprint for efficient organisation, whether it be Fordist-Taylorist bureaucracy, 
the M-form organisation, or whatever, was challenged through the empirical identification of a 
diversity of organisational forms which were seen to be a response to varying environmental 
conditions.  Burns and Stalker (1961), for example, described a continuum of organisational 
structures varying from mechanistic to organic, arguing that the former are more suited to stable, 
straightforward, and relatively predictable tasks and environments, while the latter are more 
appropriate where there is greater instability and uncertainty.  The focus on turbulence and 
uncertainty was also evident in the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) who saw a 
connection between environmental instability and organisational complexity.  Organisations in 
unstable environments tend to exhibit greater complexity because they are increasingly 
differentiated into distinct subsystems which concentrate on specific task areas and relate to 
limited segments of the external environment relevant to their activities.   
Rather than being closed and self-sufficient entities, organisations are envisaged as open systems 
which can not be insulated from the outside world because their boundaries are necessarily and 
continuously crossed by inputs and outputs, the character of which impose constraints and 
contingencies relative to the technological and task environments of the organisation.  In this 
sense, the outward-facing boundaries of organisation are considered less like the solid walls of a 
 8 
container and more like a permeable membrane or zone of interaction.  Such open systems 
thinking was explicitly developed by Thompson (1967), who also gave direct consideration to 
the character of organisational boundaries, particularly through his notion of boundary-spanning 
components.  These units are established in an attempt to buffer the core activities of an 
organisation from environmental fluctuations by limiting the range of relevant contingencies 
through filtering and segmentation.  Thus, while organisational boundaries are portrayed as open, 
there are continuous attempts to moderate this openness and insulate the interior of the 
organisation from excessive turbulence. 
 
However, whilst contingency theory marked a crucial step forward in identifying a plurality of 
organisational forms and recognising the internal differentiation of complex organisations, it was 
ultimately limited because it depicted boundary-spanning influences as primarily unidirectional 
(from environment to organisation).  Constraints and contingencies are seen to flow principally 
from an environment over which organisational decision-makers appear to have no control.  
Their role is limited to identifying the relevant contingencies and modifying the structure of the 
organisation accordingly - the reference to structure being purposeful here because contingency 
theorists overwhelmingly identified formal structural solutions to the problems they identified, 
which included such things as liaison roles, departmentalisation, taskforces, projects, and matrix 
arrangements (e.g. Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, 1967b). 
    
The functionalist fallacy mentioned above in the context of TCE applies with equal force to 
contingency theory because there is the assumption that any given organisational formation is an 
optimally efficient response to the environmental conditions surrounding it (cf. Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989, for a broadly similar argument from a population ecology perspective).  Thus, 
although a diversity of alternative organisational forms are portrayed, contingency theory 
betrayed a de facto unitarism because it suggested a one-way matching of environment and 
organisation which downplayed the possibility of divergent organisational arrangements 
emerging in response to a given set of contingent conditions.   According to Child (1972), 
contingency theory was unable to account for such diversity because it lacked an adequate 
understanding of managerial agency in shaping organisations.  More recently, the literature on 
organisational cognition and sense-making has further problematised this one-to-one matching of 
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organisation and environment by highlighting variations in, and limitations to, management 
attention, absorptive capacity, perspective-taking, and environmental search processes (e.g. 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Daft and Weick, 1984). 
 
Other approaches with a systems theoretic emphasis have attempted to supply a more 
sophisticated understanding of the relationship between organisation and environment.  Drawing 
on the idiosyncratic arguments of Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987) concerning the autopoietic 
character of living systems, these approaches have challenged the view of environment as 
something that is pre-given, a distinct phenomenon that is ‘out there’.  According to Maturana 
and Varela, the unity of an autopoietic system is defined by the self-regulation and recursive 
generation of components in interaction.  Importantly, any such unity is always from the point of 
view of an observer.  Thus, “[t]he basic operation that an oberserver performs ... is the operation 
of distinction; that is, the pointing to a unity by performing an operation which defines its 
boundaries and separates it from a background” (Maturana, 1999, 161).  This operation of 
drawing distinctions is central to defining an autopoietic unity.  As Luhmann (1995, 177) has 
argued, “[f]or the theory of self-referential systems, the environment is ... a presupposition of the 
system’s identity, because identity is possible only by difference”.  It is through making these 
distinctions that the boundaries of systems are specified.  While intriguing, I personally find the 
arguments around autopoiesis somewhat abstract and difficult to follow.  In particular, it is hard 
to grasp the autopoietic character claimed for social systems because autopoiesis applies solely 
to closed and self-referential systems.  The answer appears to lie in the fact that, despite being 
closed, autopoietic systems are not immune to influences from outside.  Luhmann (1995) has 
suggested that systems can be simultaneously closed and open.  “Using boundaries, systems can 
open and close at the same time, separating internal interdependencies from system-environment 
interdependencies and relating both to each other” (Luhmann, 1995, 29).  On similar lines, Seidl 
(2000) has written about organisation as a distinction between medium and form where the 
former is not something pre-given which acts upon the form embedded in it, as in conventional 
accounts of organisation and environment.  Instead, medium and form are in a co-conditioning 
and co-evolving relationship. 
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Boundaries as socio-culturally constructed 
 
The third group of approaches to conceptualising organisational boundaries take us even further 
away from the passive and object-like depiction of boundaries as the limits of containment 
characteristic of unitarist treatments.  With Luhmann, it has already been seen that the production 
and redefinition of boundaries are an integral part of the functioning of self-referential systems, 
whereby, in the case of social systems, “the difference between system and environment is 
mediated exclusively by meaning-constituted boundaries” (Luhmann, 1995, 194, emphasis 
original).  This points towards a conception of boundaries as actively produced and reproduced 
by systems through making distinctions between identity and difference.  The operation of 
constructing and negotiating identity and difference, with concomitant implications for inclusion 
and exclusion, provides the focus for accounts which see boundaries as socio-cultural constructs.  
In contrast to approaches which encourage an essentialist image of boundaries as 
overwhelmingly fixed and stable, social constructionist accounts regard boundaries as the 
outcome of dynamic, ongoing, and potentially contested processes of inclusion/exclusion.  
Boundaries are not simply put in place and then left to their own devices; they are actively 
maintained and reproduced through continuing action and interaction.   
 
Arguments consistent with this perspective can be found in cultural theory, anthropology, 
sociology, feminist theory, and ethnomethodology where concepts of Self and Other have 
received considerable attention (e.g. Benhabib, 1992; Berg and Kearns, 1996; Bhabha, 1994; 
Oberoi, 1994; Salih, 2000; Shildrick, 1997).  Here there is frequently an emphasis on the 
discursive construction of identity and alterity through the employment of categorisations which 
designate and delimit self from non-self.  Rose (1995), for example, finds such boundary-
constituting processes in the construction of traditions.  She argues that “[t]raditions are 
constructed: written, spoken, visualized, taught, lived.  Traditions are representations of a past 
and ... the construction of a particular tradition is also always a practice of inclusion and 
exclusion” (Rose, 1995, 414).  Similarly, Lamont and Fournier (1992) have focused on the 
symbolic practices through which areas of a social territory are marked off, thereby defining the 
terms of admission and exclusion.  Central to the articulation of identity/difference and 
inclusion/exclusion are the construction and valuing of knowledge claims, which will be of 
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particular relevance to some of the themes I would like to discuss below.  As an example of this, 
McLaughlin and Webster (1998), in a study of professional identities in medicine, argue that 
knowledge, discourse, and power continually interact in the construction of identity.  “The body 
of knowledge and the professional identity develop together; shaping the meaning of each other 
and constructing the boundaries which mark out the status and legitimacy of one field over other 
forms of knowledge and expertise” (McLaughlin and Webster, 1998, 784-785, emphasis 
original).  
 
Processes of inclusion and exclusion are unavoidably political, which becomes especially evident 
where boundaries are heavily policed or subject to contestation.  An important consideration here 
concerns the degree of reciprocity or symmetry in the recognition of boundaries between those 
admitted and those excluded.  Three limit cases can be thought of as follows: there is a 
symmetrical (but not necessarily benign) identification by two groups who construct a common 
boundary between themselves, defined in both cases in opposition to the other (reciprocal 
bounding); alternatively boundaries can be imposed from the outside (ascriptive bounding) - 
which is precisely what Ryen and Silverman (2000) argue early anthropologists did around so-
called ‘native’ populations; or finally boundaries can be internally constructed by those seeking 
to mark themselves off, although this is not necessarily recognised, or perhaps even noticed, by 
those outside the group (elective bounding).  Recognising both symmetrical and asymmetrical 
forms of boundary constitution helps us to remember that social boundaries hold both positive 
and negative connotations.  They can imply security, solidarity, and belonging; but equally, and 
often simultaneously, they are about exclusion and alienation.   
 
This point sometimes seems to be missed by accounts which depict a plurality of identity 
projects and life-style choices which we are supposed to be able to move between freely as an 
aesthetic expression of our inherent multiplicity.  This is arguably applicable to the work of 
Maffesoli (1993, 1995, 1996), who has written about an irrepressible and effervescent sociality 
which bubbles up despite the atomisation and disenchantment of modernity.  Neo-tribalism, or 
the emergence of an elective communality based around participation in a multitude of actively 
created collectivities, is regarded as a celebration of the “polydimensionality of the lived 
experience” (Maffesoli, 1989, 4). 
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In the context of a complex society, everyone lives through a series of experiences which can only be 
understood in an overall sense.  Participating in a multitude of tribes, which are themselves interrelated, 
allows each person to live his or her intrinsic plurality.  These various ‘masks’ are ordered in a more or less 
conflictual way and fit together with other surrounding ‘masks’. 
 
Maffesoli (1995, 147) 
 
While Maffesoli’s pluralist and vitalist sentiments are to be welcomed (particularly in connection 
with the troubling theorisation of identity which we will return to below), the danger is that an 
aestheticised reading of shifting participation in different collective groupings promotes an 
unbalanced view of these involvements as primarily being about positive choice or simply a 
matter of taste (Osborne, 1997).  Bauman (1992) offers a rather more pessimistic interpretation, 
suggesting that these multiple acts of self-identification are inevitably fragile because they 
depend for their continued existence on an excluded Other.  This, in turn, tends to promote 
paranoia and uncertainty and often means that “such a community lives under the condition of 
constant anxiety and thus shows a sinister and but thinly masked tendency to aggression and 
intolerance” (Bauman, 1992, 235).  The argument here is that it is a short step from the positive 
affirmation of self-identity to the aggressive exclusion of others who are seen to threaten that 
identity.  However, this simply appears to be replacing a celebratory view of solidary groupings 
reflecting the puissance of the human spirit, with a dystopian view of conflict, intolerance, and 
exclusion.  A more balanced view of the social construction of boundaries would recognise the 
potential for their constitution to be played out in more or less benign or malignant ways. 
 
Since, following a social constructionist view, organisational boundaries only exist relative to 
human observers and participants, there is a sense in which they are arbitrary phenomena and, as 
such, there is an inherent ambiguity in where to locate any line of division.  As we shall see 
below, this ambiguity is particularly prescient when one considers multi-organisational projects 
where it could be argued that the project is simultaneously inside and outside any of the 
participating organisations.  However, it is important not to conflate the claim that socially-
constituted boundaries are arbitrary with the suggestion that they therefore have no ‘real’ 
existence, nor that they are completely plastic and can be revised without resistance.  Certainly 
some boundaries are ephemeral in the extreme, such as those implied by the fleeting processes of 
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participation associated with transient collectivities such as festivals, demonstrations, 
performances, spectacles, and even natural and human disasters (cf. Pipan and Porsander, 2000).  
However, other boundaries which are more enduring can take on a perceived solidity (or 
facticity) such that they begin to be regarded in naturalistic or object-like terms.  This is the point 
made by Berger and Luckmann (1966, 106, emphasis original) about reification or “the 
apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other than human 
products”.  Moreover, the suggestion that organisational boundaries are arbitrary does not mean 
that it makes no difference where they are drawn.  Indeed, the way in which we portion up the 
world according to perceived similarities and differences has important implications for where 
we focus our attention, how we act, and how others experience our actions (cf. Goodman, 1984). 
 
Network Metaphors and Dissolving Boundaries 
 
The final group of approaches I want to consider are less concerned with how boundaries are 
constructed and more interested in finding new metaphors of organisation to replace what they 
see as the problematic concept of the boundary.  In some cases, this is simply about making a 
straightforward empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of boundaries in contemporary 
organisational life. The most extreme examples of this can be found in the more unconditional 
and unchecked narratives of globalisation and corporate restructuring which claim the emergence 
of a ‘borderless world’ with ‘boundaryless corporations’ (e.g. Ashkenas et al., 1995; O’Brien, 
1992; Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Reich, 1991).  Others, in a rather more measured vein, have argued 
that the language of boundaries leads to an atomistic and insular vision of an external socio-
economic environment punctuated by clear-cut organisational entities which is ill placed to 
represent what is better regarded as a complex web of flows, relations, and interdependencies.  
These approaches “have in common that they see the need to focus on the system of 
interconnections rather than single firms in the study of how production chains are structured” 
(Rusten, 1993, p.2).  Thus, Castells (1996, 96) has spoken of a constantly shifting web-like 
industrial structure which “relies on a combination of strategic alliances and ad hoc cooperation 
projects between corporations, decentralized units of each major corporation, and networks of 
small and medium enterprises connecting among themselves and/or with large corporations or 
networks of corporations”.  However, he moderates this image of flux by introducing a tension 
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between the space of flows and the space of places, where the latter is made up of more stable 
locales “whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical 
contiguity” (Castells, 1996, 423). 
 
A key metaphor here is that of the network and variations around this theme have attracted 
considerable support in recent years (e.g. Håkansson, 1989; Håkansson and Johanson, 1993; 
Johanson and Mattsson, 1991; Nohria and Eccles, 1992; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1997).  These 
accounts portray a situation where the traditional boundaries of organisation are being 
decomposed into intricate clusters of relationships where the image of organisations as 
absolutely bounded entities is replaced by that of nodes, hubs, and connections of varying 
density, duration, and intensity.  As Wells and Cook (1991, 17) have suggested, the “globalised 
firm has indistinct and shifting boundaries, we may expect it to be networked or distributed in 
organisational structure rather than being hierarchical, and it may penetrate or exploit space by 
proxy or in cooperation with other firms rather than in ‘isolation’”.  A network approach to 
organisation has much to recommend it, particularly because it shifts attention away from 
formally defined organisations, such as the legally-bounded firm, as the privileged unit of 
analysis, leaving it free to seek out those boundary-crossing and interpenetrating clusters of 
interaction through which socio-economic activity tends to be played out.  As Cowling and 
Sugden (1987, 62) have pointed out, an organisation “conceived as the means of coordinating 
production from one centre of strategic decision-making need not coincide with a ‘legal firm’.  
Indeed, it may encompass many legal firms”.   
 
However, there are some who caution against seeing the intensely fluctuating interconnectedness 
of the socio-economic landscape as signalling an end to organisational boundaries or even the 
death of the corporation.  Dicken and Thrift (1992), for example, are keen to reassert the 
continuing significance of the business enterprise, particularly of large corporations, arguing that 
“we cannot afford to forget the sheer organizational resources of large corporations and the 
social power into which these translate” (Dicken and Thrift, 1992, 288).  Equally, the idea that 
organisational boundaries have lost any relevance is not consistent with the point made by Teece 
(1998, 2000) that, as production becomes more and more interlinked, organisational decision-
makers have become increasingly concerned with protecting the knowledge assets of the 
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organisation through such mechanisms as the exercise of intellectual property rights (see also, 
Boisot and Griffiths, 1999).  Hirschhorn and Gilmore (1992) have also argued that the so-called 
‘boundaryless corporation’ actually involves the formation of new boundaries based on new 
criteria rather than the disappearance of boundaries altogether. 
 
Other approaches have challenged the boundary metaphor less on the empirical grounds that 
networks provide a more accurate representation of current organisational forms and more 
because it is a fundamentally limited and limiting concept.  As soon as one thinks of a boundary 
it is hard not to impose an uncrossable cleavage between inside and outside, separating out both 
sides and according each a lucid and self-sufficient identity grounded in presence (cf. Malavé, 
1998).  Law (1999, 6) interprets this as consistent with a specific topological understanding 
based on Euclideanism, where “[o]bjects with three dimensions are imagined precisely to exist 
within a comformable three dimensional space”.  Such a topology is homogenising and so 
alternative metaphors alluding to different topological possibilities are a way of opening out 
towards complexity.  Law (1999, 6-7) goes on to suggest that “the notion of ‘network’ is itself an 
alternative topological system ... [where o]bject integrity ... is not about a volume within a larger 
Euclidean volume.  It is rather about holding patterns of links stable”.  In trying to think about 
the intricate interpenetration of identity and difference, continuity and change, Law and Mol 
(2000) draw on and extend Latour’s notion of the immutable mobile to take the topological 
possibilities even further (Latour, 1987).  The employment of oxymoronic terms such as 
immutable mobile is intended to sidestep the disabling paradoxes of identity within difference, or 
continuity within change.  An immutable mobile can be thought of through the example of a 
vessel which holds its shape despite moving through space.  To this, Law and Mol (2000) add 
three other possibilities - immutable immobile, mutable mobile, and mutable immobile - to 
represent the simultaneous interplay of different possibilities of similarity and difference. 
 
A similar concern with unsettling conventional conceptions of identity and difference in 
straightforward terms of presence and absence can be found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
(e.g. Deleuze, 1983, 1994; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1988).  Again, standard metaphors are 
considered misleading and in need of replacement.  Thus, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) propose 
to replace what they regard as dominant metaphors of arborescence, with their emphasis on 
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vertical, branching, hierarchical, ‘tree-like’ thinking which seeks out identity according to the 
principle of root or origin, with the more horizontal, uncentred, and multiply interlinked 
metaphor of the rhizome, which is a device for thinking about connectedness without thinking 
about a ‘specious unity’ (Deleuze, 1995, 30).  The intention is, to borrow a phrase from Werner 
Marx, to think multiplicity as multiplicity (Marx, 1985).  As Deleuze (1983, 157) has suggested, 
“a theory does not [should not?] totalize; it is an instrument of multiplication and it also 
multiplies itself” (Deleuze, 1983, 157).  Rhizomatic thinking is a style of ‘nomad thought’ which 
“does not lodge itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority ... Rather than analyzing the world 
into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One (= Two) of self-reflection, and 
ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of circumstances in a shattering blow.  It synthesizes a 
multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for 
future rearranging” (Massumi, 1992, 5-6).  By acknowledging constant leakages across the 
ostensibly discrete boundaries of categories of thought as self-concept, the whole notion of 
boundedness is problematised.  As Lechte (1994, 102) has suggested, the radical horizontality of 
the rhizome “does not entail the firming of boundaries between identities, as is the case with 
representational thought based on the Same, but leads instead to the permeability of all 
boundaries and barriers”. 
 
Thinking through alternative metaphors, such as network or rhizome, is useful because it opens 
up new ways of seeing and unsettles the assumptions that have congealed around the notion of 
boundary.  However, there is a crucial ambiguity in such exercises because there is considerable 
slippage between the descriptive and prescriptive facets of these claims.  That is to say, we are 
left in a state of uncertainty as to whether the radically horizontal possibilities of these ways of 
thinking are a more adequate representation of the complexity, interconnectedness, and 
ambiguity of states of affairs in the world, which vertical and hierarchical thought fails to 
capture; or whether this horizontality is something which these accounts think the (social) world 
should conform to more closely.  To speak of the former would be to pursue an altogether 
modernist concern with unmasking conceptual errors, and yet, while such accounts would be 
unwilling to admit such an orientation, it is difficult to see what other role the challenging of 
arborescent thought occupies.  The latter, prescriptive reading is one which appears from 
considering the political implications of Deleuze and Guattari (1983), who appear keen to assert 
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the creativity and vitalism of deterritorialising impulses which break down the boundaries of 
vertical thought, with both malevolent and liberating possibilities.  As Pearson (1997) has 
argued, the critical task “can only be that of decoding and deterritorializing the prevailing 
administrative and regulatory machines - in the State, in philosophy, in science, in culture and 
information - that have defined and restricted the present by despotically blocking the free flow 
of energy and knowledge throughout the social machine”.  One way of working with the 
ambiguity of description/prescription flows from considering the peculiar position of thought in 
human action.  Thus, it may well be that social realities rarely submit easily to discrete 
categorisation as there is always horizontal slippage between identity and non-identity, but at the 
same time human agents are consistently bringing such a state of affairs into existence precisely 
by categorising the world into similarities and distinctions and then acting upon these thought 
objects.  While a world without fixed boundaries may offer a liberating potential, this is 
constantly being frustrated by attempts to reduce plurality to a difference based on identity.  In 
other words, people routinely behave as if the world is cross-cut by boundaries of similarity and 
difference. 
 
To summarise the argument so far, I have attempted to show that the conceptualisation of 
boundaries appears in numerous guises in organisation theory (and social theory more generally), 
most of which have something to offer to the understanding of boundaries.  Transaction cost 
economics, as well as responses from resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm, for all 
their problems, have the benefit of posing questions about where the boundaries of organisation 
are located.  Systems-based approaches have raised issues about the boundary-crossing 
influences between organisation and environment, as well as challenging the image of 
organisations as internally coherent entities.  Social constructionist accounts have provided a 
theorisation of boundaries as being actively constituted through the complex interplay of 
constructions of identity and difference.  Finally, the introduction of alternative metaphors, such 
as network or rhizome, have helped to supply different ways of thinking which unsettle 
conventional concepts of boundedness.  In the next section, I want to consider how this 
multiplicity of conceptions relating to organisational boundaries might offer interesting insights 
into the character of organising within temporary projects.      
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The ambiguous boundaries of project organisations 
 
Studying project organisations is useful because they disrupt many deeply held assumptions 
about organisations.  Contrary to images of organisation as sites of stability, consensus, and 
continuity, project organisations represent temporary groupings where multiple roles, identities, 
tasks, and activities intersect for a time before being dissolved and recombined into new projects.  
For those managing projects, the challenge can be thought of in terms of how to achieve some 
degree of coherence out of this diversity so as to achieve some overall task negotiated for the 
project.  Meyerson et al. (1996, 167) have captured something of the tensions faced by 
temporary project groups, portraying them in the following terms: “Temporary groups often 
work on tasks with a high degree of complexity, yet they lack the formal structures that facilitate 
coordination and control ... They depend on an elaborate body of collective knowledge and 
diverse skills, yet individuals have little time to sort out who knows precisely what.  They often 
entail high-risk and high-stake outcomes, yet they seem to lack the normative structures and 
institutional safeguards that minimize the likelihood of things going wrong”.  The problematic of 
integration and differentiation is one that has long been recognised by organisation theory.  Thus, 
as we have already seen, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) regarded organisational 
differentiation as an appropriate response to complexity.  However, such differentiation tends to 
generate differences “in cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in different 
functional departments” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, 11), which makes their integration 
difficult.  One of the solutions proffered by Lawrence and Lorsch was the project structure, 
which was seen as a way of integrating diverse functions for the performance of uncertain and 
complex tasks.  However, the simple introduction of a project form of organisation is no 
guarantee that integration will actually be achieved, in part because the problem of 
differentiation is simply displaced from the relationship between functional departments to 
reappear at the project level. 
 
To express this problematic in the language of boundaries, projects might be thought of as an 
attempt to construct, at least temporarily, a boundary of identity and coherence around a 
disparate collection of people and activities.  However, any coherence is constantly in danger of 
being undermined because projects tend to be cross-cut by any number of contours of difference.  
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The principal distinctions are around specialist tasks, roles, and occupational groupings since 
projects are typically composed of a diversity of functions (e.g. planning, design, 
implementation, commissioning, procurement, contracts management, finance, human resource 
management) and technical disciplines (e.g. electrical and electronic engineering, mechanical 
engineering, structural engineering, software engineering, systems integration, architecture).  
Having said that, there are also likely to be differences around gender, ethnicity, educational 
background, levels of experience, language, national and local cultures and sub-cultures, 
personal interests, styles of working etc. etc.    Such heterogeneity is central to project 
organisations, particularly those engaged in complex tasks, because they usually demand the 
bringing together of different yet complementary skills, competences, knowledge-sets, and 
experience.  Indeed, some have argued that the variety of perspectives, values, knowledge, and 
experience accompanying such diversity encourages a generative tension, or what Leonard 
(1995) has called ‘creative abrasion’, which is beneficial for problem-solving and knowledge 
formation.  Consequently, projects are presented with the paradox that they simultaneously 
require both identity and difference.  Without some minimal identity based on shared (or at least 
compatible) goals and objectives, it is unlikely that inter-dependent tasks will be satisfactorily 
co-ordinated and there will be fragmentation, conflict, and dissociation.  However, if  coherence 
is achieved at the expense of heterogeneity, then projects run the risk of ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 
1974), lack of creativity, and defensive isolation.  This tension between identity and difference is 
not resolvable in a once and for all manner, but is an always emergent, reversible, and potentially 
unstable process of negotiation. 
 
In the spirit of the multiple account of boundaries offered earlier, it is useful to think about the 
formation of boundaries around and within projects through a variety of different conceptual 
lenses.  One way of approaching this is through theorising project boundaries according to the 
overlapping categories of the social, the spatial, and the temporal.  It has already been suggested 
that projects tend to be cross-cut by socio-cultural differences, but this says rather little about the 
processes through which such differences are created, enforced, or potentially overcome.  It is 
important to avoid culturalist arguments here, whereby it is assumed that it is possible to read off 
particular normative characteristics of people according to their occupation, role, gender, 
nationality, or whatever.  Norm conforming behaviour is not an expression of innate differences 
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which permit no alternative expressions.  Where collective norms can be identified, they are 
always created, reaffirmed, updated, or destroyed through ongoing action and interaction.  Any 
consideration of norms as something exhibited by (or expressive of) cohesive groups is 
problematic.  This is because individuals are likely to orientate themselves to a multitude of 
overlapping identity positions, especially in highly differentiated societies.  Consequently, to 
claim that an individual conforms to group and role expectations as, for example, a structural 
engineer, a project member, a member of a professional institution, a husband, wife, or partner, a 
keen tennis player or golfer etc. raises the question as to which of these identity orientations one 
should seize upon as informing behaviour under a particular context.  A plausible answer is that 
it is unlikely to be any single one of these; but at the same time, neither will all be equally 
relevant.  Here Mead’s notion of the complex self made up of an interlocking collection of 
elementary selves is useful (Mead, 1934).  Similarly, Goffman’s arguments about alternative 
presentations of self to different audiences are informative (Goffman, 1959).  The construction of 
identity according to a range of different bases opens up the possibility for internalised conflicts 
where, say, one’s role as a structural engineer and a member of a project might come into a 
situation of incompatibility. 
 
Having depicted a multiplicity of identity-constituting conditions and their potential for 
inconsistency, this is not to say that there is no such thing as the development of group cohesion 
based on shared norms, values, and expectations of behaviour, nor that the multiple boundaries 
of identity are wholly permeable, such that one can move between identity positions effortlessly 
and without being challenged.  In the case of project organisations, there would seem to be a 
range of different boundary-defining processes of greater or lesser formality which are involved 
in constituting identities and differences.  More formal mechanisms include contractual 
arrangements and designated organisational structures which lay out the objectives of the project, 
apportion roles and responsibilities, establish reporting procedures, and define property rights 
and the allocation of commercial gains and losses.  These operate to create boundaries around the 
project as a whole, as well as partitioning it up into specific functions and activities.  There also 
tend to be relatively formal boundaries around different occupational and professional groupings 
which are often maintained through institutional mechanisms, such as the regulation of 
membership and codes of practice of professional bodies.  However, there are also less formal 
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and less easily identifiable boundary-constituting processes.  These include inter-personal 
ascriptions of belonging and non-belonging which may be expressed through such practices as 
inclusion in (or exclusion from) networks of communication.  Such ascriptions can be based on 
any number of identity markers including the recognition of shared interests or values, status, 
experience, language, etc. 
 
The boundaries of project organisations also need to be considered according to their spatial and 
temporal aspects.  A visual bias in imagining boundaries means that it is easy to think of them in 
terms of a particular topology - that of a contiguous space encircled by a border.  However, 
project teams are not always contained within a single locale and may be spread out widely over 
a number of locations.  Where projects are more dispersed, it is tempting to think of them as 
being cut across by boundaries of physical space which have inevitable implications for social 
relations within the project.  However, there is a long tradition of work in geography which has 
recognised the dangers of a reified and absolute conception of space, warning against attributing 
it independent causal powers (Benko and Strohmayer, 1997; Gregory, 1994; Gregory and Urry, 
1978; Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1984; Merrifield, 1993; Unwin, 2000).  It is not sufficient to point 
to the spatial configuration of a particular project and simply read off necessary characteristics 
from this configuration, such as the frequent claim that communication in co-located project 
teams is always richer and more intense than that in dispersed teams.  Spatial relations, while 
carving out a more or less constrained zone of possibility, are mediated through social, 
institutional, political, and technological practices.  The simple fact that members of a project are 
in the same location is no guarantee that they will communicate effectively.  A more fruitful way 
of thinking about the interplay between social and spatial relations can be found in the writing of 
Lefebvre (1991), who argued that social relationships produce, or are expressed through, a 
particular organisation of space, which at the same time reacts back upon them.  There is a 
continuous dialectic between the social production of space and the spatial production of society.  
Thus, project organisations bring into being a particular space which rebounds by opening up 
certain possibilities and closing off others. 
 
The typically spatialised or topological conception of boundaries should not blind us to the 
suggestion that boundaries can equally be constituted through temporality, which should also be 
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conceived in relative, socially produced/productive, rather than absolute and abstract terms.  For 
projects, the most obvious point to recognise is that, by their very nature, they are temporally 
bounded.  That is to say, they have a finite timescale, the duration of which can have important 
implications for identity-forming processes.  While longer projects permit more long-lasting 
interaction between project members, making it more likely for an overall project identity to 
emerge, there may not be time on shorter projects for this to occur.  In addition, the 
discontinuous temporality of project work acts to set projects apart from other more continuous 
organisational activities which follow a different, less punctuated, temporal rhythm (cf. Clark, 
1985, and his distinction between ‘even and ‘event’ time).  Different experiences of time 
between project and non-project elements of organisations can make any interfaces between 
them problematic.  Projects may also be cross-cut by internal temporal divisions.  The most 
evident of these are the separation of projects into variously structured phases which may or may 
not overlap.  While a core group of key individuals may follow a project continuously from 
inception through to completion, more often than not projects involve a changing progression of 
specialist groupings entering to undertake their tasks and then exiting.  This influences the 
continuity of social relations, learning processes, and communication within the project. 
 
While I have considered the social, spatial, and temporal dimensions surrounding the formation 
of project boundaries separately, this should not be taken to suggest that they are not 
interconnected.  Indeed, in highlighting the relative, socially constituted and constituting 
character of time-space, it should be clear that all three dimensions are inseparable (cf. Urry, 
1985).  This further contributes to the image of project boundaries as plural, partially 
overlapping, and ambiguous.  One consequence of this multiplicity and ambiguity is that it 
makes it difficult to conceive of projects as sites of stability where clear and routine patterns of 
interaction are possible.  Focusing on one aspect of this, Goodman and Goodman (1976, 495) 
have suggested that when the “task is complex with respect to interdependence of detailed task 
accomplishment, so that it is not easy to define tasks clearly and autonomously ... [then] 
members must keep interrelating with one another in trying to arrive at viable solutions”.  This is 
an image of emergence in which continuous interaction is crucial.  The emergent character of 
projects means that ongoing communication to resolve issues as they arise is critical.  However, 
since language and communication also play a central role in constituting identity and difference, 
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the likelihood arises that the internal differentiation of projects will make communicative 
interactions potentially problematic.  Consequently, the remainder of the paper focuses in on 
issues of communication and inter-subjective understanding, partly to explore the barriers to 
communication and the conditions for overcoming them, but also to demonstrate that different 
approaches to these issues hold their own implications for conceptualising identity and 
difference.  
 
Projects and the problem of inter-subjective understanding 
 
There is a long-standing view that the problems encountered by projects can largely be traced to 
pathologies in communication.  This was one of the key conclusions of the socio-technical 
systems work conducted by the Tavistock Institute in the 1960s into project organisations in the 
construction industry (Crichton, 1966; Higgin and Jessop, 1965).  Given the conditions of 
uncertainty, complexity, and interdependence typically associated with projects, these authors 
argued that the fragmentation of project activities into specialised task areas, solidified by 
historically specific processes of institutionalisation around crafts and professions, contributed to 
serious problems in communication.  More recently, a series of major reports on the construction 
industries of the UK and US reached a broadly similar conclusion, arguing that the ineffective 
performance of projects could be traced to poor communication and persistent conflict in a 
climate of distrust between project participants (e.g. Construction Industry Institute, 1989; 
Latham, 1994).  Accordingly, these reports suggested that project performance could be 
improved by finding ways of encouraging mutual understanding between project members.   
 
However, the work by the Tavistock Institute and, to a lesser extent, these more recent reports, 
all tended to regard the problem of communication in terms of an absence of information.  That 
is to say, the differentiation of projects into distinct yet interdependent task areas, which are also 
often split into separate phases, disrupts the flow of information.  Thus, to take a regularly 
mentioned example, project planners and designers involved in the early stages of a project often 
do not have the benefit of information from those responsible for implementation as to how easy 
their design will be to implement.  However, this focus on informational disruptions, which is 
largely consistent with an information processing view of organisation (e.g. Galbraith, 1977), 
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fails to recognise that improving the circulation of information will not necessarily resolve the 
issue.  Even if those responsible for design and project implementation do communicate, this 
does not mean that they arrive at a shared interpretation of the issue at hand.  The information 
processing view tends to conflate knowledge and information, promoting an object-like and 
static view of knowledge as a stable bundle of representations which can be transferred and 
decoded unproblematically.  Cook and Brown (1999) have termed this sort of depiction of 
knowledge an epistemology of possession.  A conceptualisation of knowledge as a collection of 
stable representations lies behind the recent emphasis in so-called knowledge management on 
capturing, transferring, and re-using knowledge, often with a heavy reliance on information 
technology (e.g. Gore and Gore, 1999; Gupta et al., 2000; Haerem and Sgholt, 1995; O’Dell and 
Grayson, 1998).  An epistemology of possession encourages an impoverished understanding of 
the crucial social dimensions of knowledge as situated, contingent, and context-dependent, 
constituted through negotiated processes of inter-subjective meaning formation and shaped 
through mutually intelligible communicative practices (cf. Blackler, 1995; Gherardi, 1999; 
Orlikowski and Yates, 1994).  In short, it downplays the importance of social context in 
achieving understanding. 
 
One theoretical tradition which has attempted to address the social context of understanding is 
hermeneutics.  It is therefore useful to consider some of the contributions of this tradition, as well 
as critical responses to it.  The starting point for hermeneutics is the recognition that there is a 
fundamental limitation in our ability to know the concerns and experiences of other people 
because, of necessity, inter-subjective understanding is symbolically mediated, with language 
being the principal, but by no means only, system of symbolic exchanges.  As Gadamer (1976, 
25) has suggested, “there would be no hermeneutical task if there were no mutual understanding 
that has been disturbed and that those involved in a conversation must search for and find again 
together”.  In its early forms, as in the writing of Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was concerned 
with the interpretation of canonical texts, but it was through Dilthey that the wider relevance of 
hermeneutics for all aspects of social interaction came to be recognised (Dilthey, 1989).  
However, Dilthey’s notion of ‘empathic excavation’ has been interpreted by critics of 
hermeneutics as involving some sort of quasi-mystical process of transposing oneself into the 
mind of others in order to appreciate or empathise with their point of view (e.g. Abel, 1948).  
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Consequently, writers in the hermeneutic tradition have been at pains to outline a more robust 
foundation for inter-subjective understanding than the concept of empathy. 
 
One of the main inspirations for hermeneutics came from the phenomenology of Husserl (1931, 
1970), although it attempted to move beyond his search for epoché as a way of finding a 
presuppositionless space from which to construct a secure theory of knowledge.  Epoché, or 
transcendental reduction, refers to the ‘bracketing’ of ego’s flux of experience, an act of 
withdrawal involving the suspension of engagement in direct experience in order to adopt a 
reflective attitude, which is seen as the condition of possibility for grasping some ideal or 
originary meaning.  Hermeneutics also marked a departure from the effectively subject-object 
orientation within Husserl of an individual standing in relation to an external reality which enters 
consciousness via a stream of lived experience.  According to Lash (1999, 149), phenomenology 
“is much less equipped to deal with the relation of the ego to other human beings.  Husserl had 
no satisfactory way of moving from the transcendental reduction of objects by the ego to the 
understanding of the ‘alter ego’ or ‘other’”.  For hermeneutics, transcendental reduction on the 
part of an external observer is incapable of getting behind the pre-interpreted character of the 
social world.  As Heidegger (1962 [1927], 191-192) argued, “[w]henever something is 
interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception.  An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of 
something presented to us”.  Ego encounters a world which can never be conceptually pristine 
because one finds a world which is already symbolically structured by those ‘others’ acting 
within it.  Similarly, for Schütz (1962, 5-6), the social world “has a particular meaning and 
relevance structure for the human beings living, thinking, and acting therein.  They have 
preselected and preinterpreted this world by a series of common-sense constructs of the reality of 
daily life, and it is these thought objects which determine their behavior, define the goals of their 
action, the means available for attaining them”. 
 
The crucial features of social conduct emphasised within the hermeneutic tradition are inter-
subjectivity as a condition of understanding, as well as the role of pre-existing shared 
interpretative resources which make such understanding possible and shape the processes of 
meaning generation.  The significance of inter-subjectivity for hermeneutics can be found in its 
 26 
recognition that the self only exists as it does in relation to other selves.  In part this flows from 
the observation that, in order to participate with adequate competence in inter-subjectively 
conditioned acts of reaching understanding, one must have access to shared interpretative 
resources, including relevant aspects of what Schütz and Luckman (1973) called the social stock 
of knowledge.  This taken-for-granted knowledge is socially distributed and forms the 
background assumptions, typificatory schemes, and symbolic resources which individuals in 
interaction draw upon.  “I live in the common-sense world of everyday life equipped with 
specific bodies of knowledge.  What is more, I know that others share at least part of this 
knowledge, and they know that I know this.  My interaction with others in everyday life is, 
therefore, constantly affected by our common participation in the available social stock of 
knowledge” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 56).  A key characteristic of the social stock of 
knowledge is its differentiation according to zones of familiarity and relevance, with more 
detailed and complex knowledge about those areas which are more familiar and relevant to an 
individual.  Furthermore, all aspects of the social stock of knowledge as a whole are not brought 
into focus uniformly at any given time.  Instead, drawing on Husserl’s concept of attention, the 
concentration on different areas of knowledge shifts according to context, such that as “some 
zones of reality are illuminated, others are adumbrated” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 59). 
 
It is the recognition of a set of taken-for-granted assumptions which forms the basis in 
hermeneutics for addressing the problem of inter-subjective understanding without recourse to 
empathic arguments.  It is the joint participation in the social stock of knowledge which creates 
the conditions of possibility for inter-subjective understanding.  Crucially, understanding may be 
severely truncated without such participation.  It is through the ‘merging of horizons’, according 
to Gadamer (1989), or the synthesis of background knowledges, according to Schütz (1972), that 
the mutual understanding of ego and alter can emerge.  As Lash (1999, 150-151) explains, “the 
more closely contexts of experience match, the more possible it is to achieve simultaneous flow 
of experience ... The less that the other is part of this ‘We’, the greater the extent to which I see 
his or her acts as ‘external facts’ ... The more, on the other hand, I can enter into a We 
relationship with you and come to grasp your project, your ‘in-order-to’ motives, the more 
genuine understanding, i.e. verstehen, is at issue”. 
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Here again the significance of context comes to the fore.  Consistent with this is the work of 
Garfinkel (1984) which highlights the context-dependency of language, whose normal operation 
depends on the presumption of a shared understanding of context permitting the suspension of 
the disruptive requirement to make explicit the background assumptions lying behind any 
utterance, which in theory could result in an infinite regress of explication.  Of course, any 
presumption of mutual contextual understanding or shared access to the same provinces of the 
social stock of knowledge may prove to be unfounded.  A mismatch of assumptions or ignorance 
of conventions may thus be a fertile source of misunderstanding.  This is exactly the problem 
often encountered by multi-disciplinary and multi-functional projects.  Different groupings, 
around occupation or technical discipline, for example, are likely to develop their own language 
communities exhibiting different zones of relevance and drawing on aspects of the social stock 
of knowledge which do not necessarily overlap.  This is similar to the later Wittgenstein’s 
arguments about a plurality of language games.  Crucially, “this multiplicity is not something 
fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come 
into existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten ... Here the term ‘language-game’ is 
meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a 
form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 11).   
 
As a consequence, it is important not to think of the context of communication as an immutable 
backdrop, but rather as something which is created, reproduced, or changed through acts of 
communication.  Thus, while barriers to understanding may well be maintained between 
different project groupings, they are not pre-given.  Indeed, it may be that through continued 
interaction during the course of a project different groupings may collectively come to 
participate in new language games based on shared experiences in working on the project.  At 
the same time, such collective experiences may form the basis for a shared identity whereby 
project members associate themselves more closely with the project than with their respective 
roles, functional departments, or organisations (e.g. Merali, 2000).  However, since temporal 
boundedness is one of the key characteristics of projects, there is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether there is the time for collective understanding and identities to emerge.  Here again, 
project members in lieu of direct and extensive participation in a joint context of action are likely 
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to inter-relate more on the basis of surrogates, such as generalised role expectations (cf. 
Meyerson et al., 1996). 
 
Critical responses to hermeneutics and the question of identity 
 
While the focus in hermeneutics on shared interpretative resources as the basis for inter-
subjective understanding provides a plausible account of how meanings are negotiated, this does 
not mean that it has been without its detractors.  Criticisms have come mainly from two 
directions; one side arguing that it has gone too far in portraying “an indefinite multiplicity of 
interpretative possibilities” (MacIntyre, 1990, 205), while the other suggests that it has not gone 
far enough.  In an intellectual climate where metaphysical certainties have been challenged and it 
is difficult to hold to a conception of truth as a direct mirror of reality (cf. Rorty, 1980), these 
two sides of the debate can be characterised (or should that be caricatured?) according to whether 
or not they are searching for a new ground upon which to secure the validity of certain 
knowledge claims over others.  This, in turn, has important implications for how identity and 
difference are theorised. 
 
The first style of criticism can be found in critical theory and critical realism.  For these 
approaches, there is the danger of what Wellmer (1971) termed ‘hermeneutic idealism’.  The 
concern here is that hermeneutics, by focusing on the possibilities and limitations of linguistic 
interaction, reduces all social conduct to the question of interpretation and understanding.  
Bhaskar (1979, 136), for example, argues that hermeneutics, “correctly perceiving ideas to be 
distinctive of social reality, incorrectly infers them to be exhaustive of it”.  Linked to this 
criticism is the concern that hermeneutics ultimately encourages an indifferent relativism.  This 
stems from the hermeneutic assumption that the social world of human actors remains 
necessarily opaque to those who do not participate in that particular social setting.  Since genuine 
understanding can only be gained through an appreciation of the context-dependent rules and 
conventions guiding the interpretation of concepts and ideas, it is considered difficult and 
inappropriate to search for external reference points from which to evaluate the knowledge 
claims made within any given social setting.  As a consequence, these contingent and localised 
knowledge claims, the so-called lay knowledge of everyday life, are depicted as inherently 
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authentic and (to borrow Bhaskar’s term) incorrigible, that is to say, they are not susceptible to 
challenge and correction from outside.  For Bhaskar (1979), this, in turn, reflects an ignorance of 
the intransitive dimension of social reality which exists independently of thought.  In other 
words, there are aspects of social reality which are relatively enduring (not intransitive in the 
sense of eternally unchanging) and which hold regardless of the beliefs that people entertain 
about them (to make matters more complicated, such  beliefs may themselves become part of the 
intransitive dimension).  Practical adequacy, not absolute truth, is the watchword here: 
“although the nature of objects and processes (including human behaviour) does not uniquely 
determine the content of human knowledge, it does determine their cognitive and practical 
possibilities for us” (Sayer, 1992, 70). 
 
Practical adequacy and the intransitive dimension provide the foundations in critical realism for 
steering a course between the twin misapprehensions of theory-neutrality and theory-dependency 
and for engaging in an emancipatory critique of societies.  The same style of argument, 
somewhat differently approached, can be found in the attempt by Bourdieu (1977) to develop a 
theory of practice which permits an objective analysis aware of its own limitations, and in the 
work of Habermas (1984, 1987a), who endeavours to demonstrate the guiding rationality of all 
communicative interactions as a way of finding a universal basis from which to launch a critical 
theory.  For the latter, hermeneutics contains the seeds of its own destruction because it 
unleashes a problematic that it is unable to resolve.  By emphasising the conventional character 
of truth claims and by highlighting the centrality of interpretative capacities as a condition of all 
social conduct, hermeneutics undermines any privileged claims to knowledge of observer 
relative to observed.  “As soon as we ascribe to the actors the same judgmental competence that 
we claim for ourselves as interpreters of their utterances, we relinquish an immunity that was 
until then methodologically guaranteed ... We thereby expose our interpretation in principle to 
the same critique to which communicative agents must mutually expose their interpretations” 
(Habermas, 1984, 119, emphasis original). 
 
For critical realism and critical theory, the question appears to be one of how to rescue claims to 
knowledge from a damaging relativism by finding a secure position from which to arbitrate over 
alternative validity claims.  By contrast, those with sympathies towards what might broadly 
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speaking be termed postmodernist themes and styles of argumentation appear less concerned by 
any loss of privileged insight and indeed eschew any search for an Archimedean point from 
which to achieve such an arbitration.  From this perspective the weakness of hermeneutics does 
not so much lie with its recognition of the socially-constructed, symbolically-mediated, and 
contingent problem of understanding, but rather with its inadequate treatment of questions of 
identity and difference.  In particular, hermeneutics is criticised for not going far enough in 
collapsing the Cartesian dualism between subject and object because it consistently returns to an 
egological reading where the intentional self is ultimately favoured.  As Soja (1989, 135) has 
observed, the “dilemma connects back to ... the problem of ‘divided being’, the powerful 
separation between the thinking subject and the ‘grounding’ object, the transcendental ego and 
the world as lived”. 
 
It might come as a surprise that postmodernist thinking is being portrayed here not as a 
sympathiser but as a critic of hermeneutics.  However, to draw too close an identity between the 
two sets of ideas is to collapse postmodernist writing into interpretative approaches, and the 
latter into hermeneutics, which is precisely the error committed by Bauman (1988) in his desire 
to trace the emergence of postmodern sociology to a particular conjuncture of cultural impulses 
during the 1960s.  On closer inspection, the relationship between postmodernist thought, 
especially French post-structuralism, and hermeneutics is rather ambiguous.  This stems, in part, 
from the peculiar characteristics of post-structuralism in France as a critical, yet incomplete, 
departure from structuralism, reproducing many of the latter’s anti-phenomenological arguments 
(Dews, 1987).  Arguably the rift between phenomenologically-inspired hermeneutics and post-
structuralist variants of postmodernist thinking can be effectively summarised, following 
Jameson (1991), as the difference between ‘depth models’ and ‘depthlessness’.  Continuing to 
pay homage to Husserl’s transcendental reduction of the flux of experience, albeit in the revised 
form of a transcendental inter-subjectivity, hermeneutics ultimately remains concerned with 
uncovering the hidden essences of things-in-themselves (noumena).  Post-structuralism, on the 
other hand, involves “for the most part a conception of practices, discourses, and textual play ... 
[where] depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces” (Jameson, 1991, 12).  
Characteristic of this is the notion of the hyperreal in Baudrillard (1983) and Eco (1987), where, 
 31 
to use the former’s phrase, the map precedes the territory - the image collapses into reality to 
become reality. 
 
For post-structuralism, the search for essences through the interpretative productions of the 
constituting subject is flawed.  So too is the emphasis in hermeneutics on attempting to grasp 
meaning by reconstructing the context of experience.  Derrida (1976), for example, questions 
attempts within textual analysis to access the original meaning intended by an author through 
striving to reassemble the context surrounding the production of a text.  This assumes that it is 
possible to speak of a stable meaning of which the author is aware, or alternatively, if the 
assumption of full intentionality is dropped, that it is possible to uncover what the author really 
meant through reference to historical, biographical, or psychological influences.  In contrast, 
Derrida (1976, 154), outlines as a negative justification his principles for a task of reading as 
follows: “To produce this signifying structure obviously cannot consist of reproducing, by the 
effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship 
that the writer insinuates in his exchanges with the history to which he belongs thanks to the 
element of language”.  Central to Derrida’s deconstruction is a demonstration of the 
undecidability of meaning inherent in language itself.  There is no simple identity between 
signifier and signified, but neither can there be a rigorous separation between the level of the 
signifier and the level of the signified.  Instead, we are left with a situation where “the thing 
signified is no longer easily separable from the signifier” (Derrida, in Wood and Bernasconi, 
1988, 88).   
 
Derrida is constantly at pains to expose ambiguities and ambivalences in the use of language that 
derive, not from lapses in argumentation, but rather from conditions of usage which the author is 
unaware of and which are beyond his or her control.  Thus, he points to a number of examples of 
words which have double meanings, such as pharmakon in Plato (both poison and antidote), 
supplement in Rousseau (both surplus and necessary addition), or hybris in Foucault (both 
madness and fury) (Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1981), not so much to show that words can have more 
than one meaning, but rather to argue that, even where the author takes great care to specify 
which sense is being used, the alternative sense inescapably reappears, wanted or not, in the form 
of a trace.  These provide instances of one way in which there is always some slippage of 
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meaning in the use of language.  Linguistic meaning is never complete and final, based on an 
unproblematic presence in words.  It is unstable and open to potentially infinite interpretation 
and reinterpretation, an infinite play of substitution.  Signification is not about presence, or a 
fixed identity between signifier and signified, but neither is it about difference in positive terms, 
that is to say, the difference between two identities (cf. Saussure, 1983).  Instead, it is about 
difference without positive terms, neither identity nor difference, but différance (a neologism 
which draws on another double meaning, in this case deriving from both ‘to differ’ and ‘to 
defer’).  In one sense, therefore, meaning might be thought of as difference deferred, indefinitely 
suspended due to the possibility for any number of future reinterpretations. 
 
This problematising of identity and difference is part of a more general concern within Derrida to 
unsettle the reliance in Western philosophy on binary oppositions which are ultimately based on 
a ‘metaphysics of presence’ which tries to reduce the ‘other’ to the ‘same’.  By pursuing the 
logical conclusions of philosophical assumptions, the limitations of formal logic are revealed.  
Thus, for example, Derrida makes a particular target of French structuralism, with its search for 
the underlying structures that determine human activity.  If only it could be fully uncovered, this 
system of structures would be a totality beyond which there would be no need for further 
explanation.  However, this can never succeed because totality always alludes to something 
beyond itself (total presence implies absence, inside implies outside), thus undermining its status 
as totality.  More than this, totalisation is meaningless “not because the infiniteness of a field 
cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field - that 
is, language and a finite language - excludes totalization.  This field is in effect that of play ... 
One cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the 
center, which supplements it, taking the center’s place in its absence - this sign is added, occurs 
as a surplus, as a supplement” (Derrida, 1978, 289).  As he suggests elsewhere (Derrida, 1976), 
the filling of an absence or lack by a supplement necessarily undermines the finitude or self-
sufficiency of that which needs to be supplemented. 
 
Others have approached a critique of totalisation on similar grounds.  Levinas (1981, 1987), for 
example, considered that the Western philosophical tradition includes within it a powerful 
totalising tendency which commits violence on the ‘other’ by constantly attempting to reduce it 
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to the ‘same’.  Furthermore, by conflating the ‘same’ with ‘self’, and the ‘other’ with ‘another 
self’, an equivalent violence is committed on the alterity of other individuals, on what Levinas 
called the absolutely other.  Proceeding from Husserlian phenomenology in order to criticise it, 
Levinas recognised the impossibility of knowing fully the experience of others.  Knowledge, in 
this view, is limited to the interior of the self, while other selves are beyond the horizon of the 
individual self, belonging to a domain of exteriority.  “There is in knowledge, in the final 
account, an impossibility of escaping the self; hence sociality cannot have the same structure as 
knowledge” (Levinas, 1982, 60).  Others are constituted for us through our ideas about them, 
thereby assimilating their otherness to familiar systems of categories (knowledge as adequation) 
and reducing their alterity.  Lyotard (1984) has also expressed a suspicion of totality which he 
sees as pervading Enlightenment metanarratives.  These metanarratives, it is argued, have lost 
their credibility and legitimacy.  Consequently, instead of attempting to enforce unity by 
subsuming everything within all-embracing systems of thought, we are left with the more modest 
task of constructing ‘little narratives’ addressing more localised or situated concerns.  The 
postmodern engrossment with respecting difference and heterogeneity comes out forcefully in 
Lyotard’s (1986) notion of the differend.  Contributing further to the critique of reducing the 
‘other’ to the order of the ‘same’, a differend alludes to the intractability of a dispute where the 
discourses supporting the claims of each party are incommensurable.  The differend is the party 
to a dispute which is silenced or excluded because their claims do not fit with the dominant 
discourse applied to resolve the dispute. 
 
To add a further level of complexity, another strand of postmodernist thinking has problematised 
the relationship between identity and self by speaking of the heterogeneous subject.  As we saw 
earlier, Maffesoli (1995) questions the transparent unity of self, pointing instead to the 
construction of multiple identities through engagement in diverse social aggregations as an 
expression of our ‘intrinsic plurality’.  One consequence of this ‘intrinsic plurality’ is that it 
becomes difficult to speak of any straightforward ‘authenticity’ to a single coherent self, which 
in turn casts doubt on the ultimately egological bias in hermeneutics.  From this perspective, a 
respect for ‘otherness’ can not simply derive from a relationship between ego and alter ego based 
on identity, whereby I can see in other people another self like me and vice versa.  Given a plural 
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conception of self, we are also opened up to the possibility that ‘otherness’ is integral to selfhood 
(cf. Ricoeur, 1992; Levinas, 1981).   
 
We have seen that the ‘solution’ to the hermeneutic problem is sometimes framed in terms of a 
merging of horizons in which the here-and-now of an action context is privileged as the site of a 
productive co-interpretation (c.f. Gadamer, 1989).  However, this leaves aside the question of 
how far this meshing of horizons to provide shared interpretative resources needs to proceed in 
order for some level of understanding to be possible.  As Bhaskar (1979) has observed, total 
identity and total difference in meaning frames are both antithetical to communicative acts of 
reaching understanding because, in the former case, their complete overlap makes 
communication pointless, while in the latter it is impossible.  Having said that, there is 
considerable room for variation in the degree of overlap between these two extremes.  One 
source of variation is in the diverse experiences and identity projects which people bring to 
action contexts, some of which may (partially) coincide, while others are quite contradictory.  
This suggests an open-ended process of negotiation, drawing upon different dimensions of 
identity in which there is likely to be some slippage between varying frames of meaning, belief, 
and value.  One crucial aspect of this is that these differing interpretative lenses are not 
hermetically sealed off from each other and there is the potential for a creative dialogue between 
them as existing frames encounter new contexts. 
 
For critics of postmodernist thinking, the difficulty with deconstruction, the de- centring of self, 
and the recognition of an infinite play of meaning is associated with the risk of complete 
relativism where there are no longer any reference points from which to evaluate alternative 
validity claims (e.g. Eagleton, 1996; Habermas, 1987b; 1992; Jameson, 1991).  Unfortunately, 
arguments around this issue tend to become polarised into either/or positions such that any claim 
to valid understanding is dismissed as totalitarian, and any appreciation of the transience and 
instability of meaning is dismissed as relativistic.  It is not surprising therefore that the 
alternative perspectives from which these caricatured positions derive are often portrayed as 
incommensurable (e.g. Wood and Foster, 1997).  Part of the difficulty comes from attempting to 
resolve paradoxes which by their nature are unresolvable.  The hermeneutic circle, specifying the 
simultaneous subject-object status of individuals, is a case in point.  To reiterate, mutual 
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understanding is only possible given shared frames of meaning - without these communication is 
impossible - yet if they coincide exactly then it is unnecessary.  Perhaps the issue is not either 
aiming for complete understanding of the ‘other’, or alternatively despairing at the impossibility 
of any such understanding, but rather about a balanced scepticism which appreciates the limits of 
(self-)understanding without seeing them as absolute.  It is about understanding as movement 
towards rather than as destination.  As Sonderegger (1997, 204-205, emphasis original) has 
argued:  
 
The two reading strategies - the ‘violent’ understanding of a text and the submission to one - both lead, 
taken in isolation, to a ‘bad infinity in the Hegelian sense: one either sticks fast in impenetrable arrogance, 
or remains a child forever ... Instead of differentiating between violent and non-violent readings it would be 
better to think of the whole process of understanding as a violent conflict, an irresolvable conflict between 
two moments that are constitutive of the process of understanding ... Understanding is not a fusion of 
horizons, or a reconciliation between the interpreter and her ‘object’.  It is a process of mutual questioning. 
 
Concluding remarks on the politics of knowledge and identity 
 
Unfortunately (especially as I fear the reader may now be getting weary), the achievement of 
inter-subjective understanding is by no means the end of the story.  As Rorty (2000) has pointed 
out, shared understanding between actors in no way implies mutual agreement.  Participants in a 
dispute may reach a satisfactory appreciation of each other’s position, but this does not mean that 
they necessarily agree with the alternative views presented.  It is for this reason that it is 
important to acknowledge the potential for interests to diverge even when understandings 
converge.  This point is not always fully appreciated.  For example, Tenkasi and Boland (1996, 
87) have suggested that “developing a comprehensive knowledge base among a community of 
highly differentiated yet reciprocally dependent individual specialists requires an ongoing 
process of mutual perspective taking where individual knowledge and theories of meaning are 
surfaced, reflected on, exchanged, evaluated and integrated with others in the organization” 
(Tenkasi and Boland, 1996, 87).  This position, closely allied to the work of Argyris and Schön 
(1978) and their distinction between espoused knowledge and theories-in-use, has the benefit of 
recognising that organisational members are often unaware of the values and beliefs that they 
hold.  It is proposed that a process of ‘surfacing’ these assumptions offers possibilities for 
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productively resolving disputes and reducing misunderstanding.  However, even if hidden 
interests and assumptions are brought into the open, this still does not necessarily mean that 
individuals will be willing to abandon them. 
 
As Habermas (1971, 1974, 1984) has emphasised, it is important to recognise that, while 
participants in communication may orientate themselves towards inter-subjective understanding 
through participation in a shared action context (even if we extend this to include the surfacing of 
unconscious beliefs), this does not mean that their goal-directed actions are the same.  Given that 
projects are made up of different groupings, each focusing on a different sub-set of project 
activities, it should come as no surprise that their goal-directed actions often diverge.  This is 
particularly likely where multiple organisations are involved in a project since disputes over the 
performance of respective actions and the distribution of commercial gains and losses often 
come to the fore.  However, contra Habermas, I do not believe that an ‘ideal speech situation’, 
where communication is undistorted by all relations of force (should such a state of affairs ever 
be found to exist), is sufficient to resolve all disputes because there are times when opposing 
claims are simply incommensurable.  In such cases, it is more likely that any resolution, should 
one actually emerge, will be an expression of power relations. 
 
There is not the space here to consider power in any detail, except to say that recent debates in 
organisation theory on this issue have been strongly influenced by the work of Foucault (e.g. 
1977, 1980).  The concept of power in Foucault departs from conventional conceptions of power 
as personalised and prohibitive (e.g. Lukes, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981), being seen instead as 
ubiquitous, anonymous, and productive, as in the ‘power of normalisation’ of carceral society.  
Rather than thinking of power as something possessed (or not possessed) by individuals and 
groups which constrains the ‘real’ interests of those upon whom it is exerted, Knights and 
McCabe, 1999, 203) argue that “power can be theorized as a medium of ‘relations’ in which 
subjectivity, as a complex, contradictory, shifting experience, is produced, transformed or 
reproduced through the social practices within which such power is exercised” (Knights and 
McCabe, 1999, 203).  This brings us back to a consideration of identity and difference because 
such a view of power challenges the notion of an independent self as a lucid, coherent, and 
immutable identity.  This, in turn, opens the way for a conceptualisation of the interplay between 
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power, knowledge, and identity-formation which questions the existence of transparent and 
unitary knowledge-guiding interests and instead permits an appreciation of the identity-
constituting struggles which individuals and groups are often engaged in.   
 
As an example of this, Fleck (1996) has considered the relationship between claims to expert 
knowledge, group identity, and power in professional organisations.  His concept of the 
credibility cycle depicts how the validation of expert knowledge is conditioned by the emergence 
of identity-affirming group processes.  Power relations have a central part to play in this cycle.  
In the most developed cases it becomes virtually self-generating and expertise may become 
effectively sedimented if expert groups are themselves able to define the criteria of value and 
efficacy through which expertise is recognised.  This provides an important reminder that power 
is never far away when knowledge claims are at stake.  Indeed, in opposition to those who claim 
an infinite stream of interpretative possibilities, there are always countervailing influences which 
attempt to effect closure on the field of possible meanings, which are simultaneously relations of 
power.  That is to say, by making certain knowledge claims or promoting certain discourses, 
there is always a process of inclusion and exclusion which attempts (always incompletely) to 
deny the feasibility of other interpretations. 
 
There is the danger in this discussion of simply substituting a pastoral view of consensus, co-
operation, and solidary organisational communities, with an equally inaccurate dystopian vision 
of ever-present contestation, domination, and conflict, which is not my intention.  It is important 
to recognise conflict and consensus as always emergent, often coexistent, and ceaselessly 
shifting conditions which are produced and reproduced with the unfolding of social relations 
under concrete situations.  Thus, while the construction of difference may lead to a politics of 
incommensurability, this needs to be counterbalanced by a recognition of the perpetual 
development of  “communities of need and solidarity in the interstices of our societies” 
(Benhabib, 1986, 353).  I have tried to show that the tension between identity and difference is 
irresolvable, but this does not mean that it can not be stabilised, at least for a time.  The key point 
here is that, by recognising their ongoing negotiation rather than attempting to force upon them a 
static categorisation, our attention is directed to the conditions through which this negotiation 
takes place.  This seems to be the route taken by theorists concerned with ethical dilemmas.  
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Putnam (1990), for example, has sought ways to encourage an openness to mutual questioning as 
a means of keeping the debate going: 
 
To adjudicate ethical problems successfully, as opposed to ‘solving’ them, it is necessary that the members 
of the society have a sense of community.  A compromise that cannot pretend to be the last word on an 
ethical question, that cannot pretend to derive from binding principles in an unmistakably constraining way, 
can only derive its force from a shared sense of what is and is not reasonable, from people’s loyalties to one 
another, and a commitment to ‘muddling through together.   
 
Coming from a different perspective, Apel (1999, 160) sees some sort of procedural agreement 
as the basis for approaching dilemmas even where discursive consent is impossible. 
 
In all of these discussions today, deep-rooted differences, and possibly conflicts, between different cultural 
traditions come into play.  And we cannot expect always to reach solutions of the problems through 
discursive consent.  But ... it has to be demanded that, even in cases of persistent dissent, we try at least to 
reach a discursive consent about the reasons of the dissent and its unresolvability in order to facilitate 
juridical compromises.  For this purpose, in a multicultural society permanent efforts of communicative 
understanding - also in the hermeneutic sense - between different traditions of ‘strong values’ ... are 
required. 
 
Whether or not these conditions of negotiation are feasible is another matter.  However, the 
recognition of the need for continually working through such tensions, rather than expecting a 
definitive solution, is at least a fruitful starting point.  Given the emergent, polydimensional, and 
ambiguous character of projects, with their attendant plurality of boundary-constituting 
processes, ongoing negotiation rather than absolute agreement is likely to be the rule rather than 
the exception. 
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